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While Bruce Ackerman is publishing a book on the rise of world constitutionalism,
Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Huq ask themselves how a constitutional democracy can be
saved from erosion or decay. The coincidence is telling. Toward the end of the 20th
century, constitutionalism seemed to have established itself as universal model for
legitimating and regulating public power. This has come with a growing willingness
to enforce constitutional norms vis-à-vis power-holders. Almost all countries that
adopted new constitutions or revised old ones after 1990 provided for some form
of constitutional adjudication. In the 21st century, however, attempts to transform
constitutional democracy into authoritarian systems by amending or circumventing
the constitution and by curbing or packing constitutional courts occur in a number of
countries, even in member states of the European Union. 
Ginsburg and Huq analyze the processes of democratic backsliding and perverting
democratic constitutionalism in various countries and ask whether an intelligent
constitutional design would be able to prevent this from happening or make it at least
more difficult. They do so not out of pure academic interest, but with the intention
to protect liberal democratic constitutionalism because they believe it to be morally
superior to alternative models, some of which are briefly discussed (such as the
“Singapore model”).
The analysis presupposes a notion of liberal democratic constitutionalism so that
one can know at what point of transformation a country departs from the model. The
authors name three core elements of democratic constitutionalism without which
a regime cannot claim to adhere to constitutional principles. These elements are,
first, free and fair elections, secondly, speech and association rights that guarantee
political participation and a free discourse, finally the rule of law. This is a rather
thin notion of liberal democratic constitutionalism, yet deliberately so. The definition
aims to be “as minimalist as possible without simply equating democracy with
elections alone”. By this narrow definition the authors hope to evade the problem that
democracy is a contested notion, probably in vain since much of the destruction of
liberal democratic constitutionalism is justified in the name of democracy. 
However, for the purposes of the book, it is in principle justifiable to apply a thin
notion. The book is not about determining an ideal type of liberal democratic
constitutionalism, but about defining below which threshold a country may not fall
without ceasing to be a liberal democratic state. Nevertheless, one may have doubts
as to whether it is not too thin a notion. It is difficult to imagine a democracy without
elections, but elections are not sufficient to qualify a regime as democratic. Rather,
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elections and the elected bodies and office holders must be embedded in an ongoing
political process so that democratic life does not exhaust itself but culminates in
elections. In particular, the losers of an election must enjoy the freedom to compete
with the majority and have a chance to become a majority themselves in future
elections. The authors do not deny this but want to secure meaningful elections by
guaranteeing basic rights to free speech and free association. Yet, like elections,
these rights have preconditions. In order to fulfill their purpose, they ought to be
grounded in rights to personal freedom and privacy at the least. Without this, speech
and association rights remain endangered and risk to be reduced to a function of
democracy. Moreover, as individual rights they are not enough to guarantee a fair
treatment of the opposition within parliament. Finally, the rule of law, understood as
compliance of government with the laws of the country, is of little value as long as
government is free to use the legislative power at will and enforcement mechanisms
are lacking. 
The main part of the book is divided in two sections, one where the ways out
of liberal democratic constitutionalism are described, and one where possible
safeguards against transforming a democratic state into an authoritarian system are
considered. 
In the first part, the authors analyze a number of countries where democratic
backsliding can be observed in recent years. They distinguish between a fast and
a slow track away from liberal democratic constitutionalism. The fast track, called
"democratic collapse“, leads to more or less authoritarian systems of government,
and it does so in a rather brief period of time. It usually happens by way of using
emergency powers or by a military coup. The transition from the Weimar Republic
to National Socialism stands for this track. In the authors’ view, however, it is
„yesterday’s instrument against democracy". Nowadays, there are more subtle
means to transform a system. The slow track is called „democratic erosion“ and
comes in two forms, either through a take-over by a charismatic populist leader or by
„partisan degradation“, either because of a failure of a whole party system or by an
electoral success of one party, which makes it invulnerable to rotation. Both forms
are analyzed in detail, and one can see that the basic pattern repeats itself more or
less in different countries. The authors identify a tool kit that consists of constitutional
amendments, the elimination of institutional checks on the majority, centralizing
executive power, shrinking the public sphere and eliminating competition.
These instruments of destroying liberal democratic constitutionalism inform the
second part where ways and means to save constitutional democracy against
attacks are discussed. The authors concede that, once a political party has
obtained the majority necessary to amend the constitution, the battle is lost. Here,
constitutional design no longer helps and everything depends on whether the
population tolerates the system change or revolts. The emphasis of the chapter
is therefore on preventing a take-over by authoritarian forces from happening or
by making it difficult for them to implement their goal after having won an election.
However, they hesitate to recommend the earliest protection against democratic
collapse or decay, the concept of militant democracy with its strongest component,
the permission to ban anti-democratic political parties because they deem the risk for
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democracy greater than the benefits. Special attention is given to the United States.
Although the authors do not hold back with their criticism of American democracy,
especially in the south of the country, they locate the US still within the group of
liberal constitutional democracies. Nevertheless, they include the United States
when it comes to developing remedies against democratic backsliding.
The list of suggestions is quite long.  They are beyond doubt helpful and when
cumulated they may well make a populist take over less likely. However, once it has
happened they seem too petty to hinder a charismatic populist leader or a populist
party to transform the system into an autocracy. Even if many loopholes are filled,
the government still retains the power to appoint office holders. The institutions and
procedures may be designed as carefully as possible and provide for intermediate
bodies for the selection of persons; yet, this will be of little help if the ruling party
can fill the positions of controlling bodies, such as courts, magistrates’ councils,
ombudsmen, media commissions etc. with its own followers and when thereby and
by legislation they succeed in bringing the media on government line. Ultimately the
question is always whether the citizens are willing to tolerate the change or resist. 
However, this does by no means affect the value of the book. It is timely and useful.
It profits from the immense comparative resources on which the authors can draw.
Some forty countries appear in the book, seven figure prominently in a list featuring
the mechanisms of constitutional backsliding. The categorization is convincing,
even if some borderline cases may be less clear than depicted. The analysis of the
various cases as well as the discussions of remedies is extremely rich. It shows what
a country at the verge of a take-over has to expect, as in spite of the differences
between various countries certain patterns repeat themselves in almost all cases.
The irony of such a book is, inevitably, that attackers and defenders alike can use
it for their purposes. But this should not be understood as an argument against its
publication.
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